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Since the founding of the first colonial college in 1636, leaders in American 
higher education have sought funds for their institutions by means such as 
soliciting wealthy individuals, conducting lotteries and enlisting subscribers. 
But full-fledged campaigns—nationally organized and conducted by paid 
staff over several years—first appeared in the late 1910s.1 In legal education, 
the first effort to mount such a campaign developed in three stages over the 
half century between 1880 and 1930. Not previously studied, this evolution 
occurred at Harvard Law School (HLS), the wealthiest and preeminent school 
during this period.2
In 1882, recognizing that legal education was “The Worst Endowed of All the 
Great Departments of Professional Education,” HLS mounted an informal drive 
to raise money.3 Supported by the president and rationalized by the dean, 
the six-month effort was organized and led by one professor who recruited 
a small network of alumni and acquaintances to help. Then, in observance 
of its centennial in 1917, the school planned and conducted the first formal 
campaign in legal education from 1915 to 1920. Finally, between 1925 and 1927 
it mounted a more elaborate campaign, headquartered in New York City 
and organized into 18 regions, which sought to employ all the strategies of 
successful university drives.
1. Scott M. Cutlip, Fund Raising in the United States 169-74 (Rutgers Univ. Press 1965). 
2. The second stage is examined in detail in Bruce A. Kimball, The Disastrous First Fundraising 
Campaign in Legal Education: The Harvard Law School Centennial, 1914-1920, J. of the 
Gilded Age and Progressive Era (Nov. 2013).
3. John O. Sargent et al., To the Friends of the Law Department of Harvard University (April 
1882) (Printed broadside, on file with the Harvard Law School Library Special Collections).
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Each of these three initial attempts at fundraising in legal education failed 
to reach, or even approach, its goal. The hope in 1882 was to raise as much as 
$80,000 and about $47,000  was pledged. The goal in the centennial campaign 
was $1 million, and less than $250,000 was subscribed. In the mid-1920s the 
goal was $5 million and about $2,250,000 was pledged, including a foundation 
grant of $750,000. Various circumstances and tactical problems contributed to 
failure in each case, but it also seemed true that “no amount of committees or 
effort is going to make contributing to a law school popular,” as the chairman 
of the centennial campaign opined.4 The fundamental and persistent problem 
was the lack of a persuasive rationale. 
Why should anyone donate money to a law school? Persuasive appeals 
had to fit the meaning and justification of financial benefaction in American 
culture and higher education. During the 1800s and early 1900s two distinct 
and successive ideologies guided such benefaction. Scholars have termed 
these “charity” and “philanthropy.” The initial efforts to mount fundraising 
campaigns in legal education attempted to present convincing answers in terms 
of those two rationales, but failed. On the one hand, donors resisted charitable 
giving to law students and law schools. On the other hand, professors and 
deans could not justify legal scholarship in philanthropic terms. They could 
not explain how legal research served the public, especially in the terms of 
natural science that suited medical research and carried the greatest weight 
among philanthropists.
This history matters because failure in fundraising prevents building 
endowment and results in dependence on tuition, which forces schools 
to maintain high enrollments and charge high tuition. When the need for 
tuition leads to overcrowding, schools expand their facilities and incur debt, 
requiring more revenue and tuition. Hence, Harvard President Charles W. 
Eliot warned in the early 1870s about “this deplorable dependence [on tuition] 
which debases so many of the professional schools of this country.”5
Charity and Philanthropy
The history of financial benefaction in the United States, particularly 
concerning colleges and universities, has received significant scholarly 
attention over the past century.6 According to some authorities, the major 
shift in American benefaction occurred in the early 20th century when 
4. Letter from James Byrne to Abbott L. Lowell (Mar. 3, 1917), in President Abbott Lawrence 
Lowell Records, at box 84 (1909-33) (on file with Harvard Univ. Archives).
5. Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report of the President of Harvard College 1871-72, at 21-22.
6. Jesse B. Sears, Philanthropy in the History of American Higher Education (Gov. Printing 
Office 1922); Eduard C. Lindeman, Wealth and Culture (Harcourt Brace 1936); Ernest 
Hollis, Philanthropic Foundations and Higher Education (Columbia Univ. Press 1938); 
Merle Curti & Roderick Nash, Philanthropy in the Shaping of American Higher Education 
(Rutgers Univ. Press 1965); Cutlip, supra note 1; Robert H. Bremner, American Philanthropy 
(Univ. of Chicago Press, 2d ed. 1988); Olivier Zunz, Philanthropy in America: A History 
(Princeton Univ. Press 2011).
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charitable giving “transcend[ed] the relationship of neighbor to neighbor” 
and became “a nationally organized phenomenon” guided by “a new 
profession” of fundraising.7 This shift from an amateur and haphazard effort 
to a professionally run enterprise that systematically canvassed the public 
has been termed a transition from “charity” to “philanthropy.”8 But the more 
fundamental transition was identified by historians Barry Karl and Stanley 
Katz to mean that financial benefaction in the United States had been guided 
largely by two distinct and successive ideologies: charity and philanthropy.9 
While this shift appeared in various domains of benefaction, it was given 
particular force by the policies of the enormous foundations that were created 
in the 1900s and 1910s.10 Scholars since the 1980s have increasingly invoked this 
“much-heralded shift.”11
Rooted in the American Protestant missionary impulse that developed 
from the Puritanism of colonial New England,12 the ideology of charity is 
founded in the sentiment of compassion or what some interpret as the wish “to 
impose a vision of the good upon others in need.”13 By either motive, charity 
is manifested in a personal response to problems of those in need and usually 
is expressed through giving to individuals. Thus, charity “engages individuals 
in concrete, direct acts of compassion and connections to other people”14 and 
attempts to alleviate “the immediate effects of . . . poverty, sickness and the 
various gross forms of social disorder.”15 As a result, charitable benefactions are 
generally personal, small scale and palliative, temporarily satisfying the needs 
of individuals known to the benefactor.16 
7. John Price Jones, The American Giver i-ii, 13-14 (Inter-River Press 1954).
8. Cutlip, supra note 1, at 202; Bremner, supra note 6, at 3, 283; Zunz, supra note 6, at 2, 3, 45-75.
9. Barry D. Karl & Stanley N. Katz, The American Private Philanthropic Foundation and the 
Public Sphere, 1890-1930, 19 Minerva 236, 236-71 (1981) [hereinafter American]. 
10. Id. at 243-4; Barry D. Karl & Stanley N. Katz, Foundations and the Ruling Class Elites, 116 
Daedalus 1, 5 (1987) [hereinafter Foundations]. 
11. Zunz, supra note 6, at 10. See Lawrence J. Friedman, Philanthropy in America: Historicism 
and Its Discontents, in Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History 6-10 (Mark 
D. McGarvie & Lawrence J. Friedman, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) [hereinafter 
Philanthropy in America: Historicism]; Dwight F. Burlingame, 3 Philanthropy in America: 
A Comprehensive Historical Encyclopedia 774 (ABC-CLIO 2004); Lawrence M. Friedman, 
Dead Hands: A Social History of Wills, Trusts, and Inheritance Law 149 (Stanford Univ. 
Press 2009).
12. Amanda Porterfield, Protestant Missionaries: Pioneers of American Philanthropy, in Charity, 
Philanthropy, and Civility in American History, supra note 11, at 51.
13. Id. at 50. See Burlingame, supra note 11, at v, 1, xxiv; Bremner, supra note 6, at 5-41.
14. Robert A. Gross, Giving in America: From Charity to Philanthropy, in Charity, Philanthropy, 
and Civility in American History, supra note 11, at 30.
15. American, supra note 9, at 243.
16. Philanthropy in America: Historicism, supra note 11, at 6-7. See Cutlip, supra note 1, at 3.
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Furthermore, charity implies that the recipients relinquish their 
independence and humble themselves before the giver. As the Progressive 
reformer Josephine Shaw Lowell observed in 1879, we cannot “be charitable to 
our equals.”17 Hence, the discourse of charity, even for colleges and universities, 
commonly employed such terms as financial “embarrassment” or “begging” 
for money, whether metaphorical or not. In 1910, the treasurer of Yale reported 
with satisfaction that “the university . . . in recent years has not borrowed in the 
open market any money to tide it over a temporary embarrassment.”18 A few 
years later, the secretary of Yale warned: “Constant personal begging on the 
part of a university is apt to be undignified and to lead to the public’s losing 
confidence in that most vital of necessities—a reputation for fearless educational 
independence.”19 Consequently, discretion, privacy and anonymity usually 
characterized charitable gifts to higher education.20
While the “stigma of charity”21 had long been recognized as problematic, 
dissatisfaction with the charitable understanding of benefaction grew rapidly 
in industrial America.22 Prompted by that dissatisfaction, as well as the rising 
authority of natural science and the drive for administrative organization in 
many aspects of American life, the philanthropic ideology emerged during 
the nineteenth century. According to Karl and Katz, philanthropy entails “a 
more scientific and business-like”23 and “abstract and institutional” approach 
to benefaction.24 Emphasizing verification through reason and evidence, 
philanthropy consults scientific research and professional expertise for an 
assessment of social ills and seeks an “orderly or systematic” strategy.25 Aiming 
to cure, rather than merely alleviate, social ills, philanthropy intends to 
address “the root causes of social dysfunction,” rather than symptoms,26 and 
seeks to establish not personal relationships between donors and recipients, 
but intermediary institutions, such as endowed foundations, that operate 
17. Josephine Shaw Lowell, Public Relief and Private Charity 89 (G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1884).
18. Lee McClung, Annual Report of the Treasurer of Yale University 1908-09 11 (1909).
19. Anson Phelps Stokes Jr., Annual Report of the Secretary of Yale University 1912-13 45 (1913).
20. William Lawrence, Memories of A Happy Life 220 (Houghton Mifflin 1926); Horace Coon, 
Columbia, Colossus on the Hudson 93-115 (Dutton 1947); Robert A. McCaughey, Stand, 
Columbia: A History of Columbia University in the City of New York, 1754-2004, at 301-3 
(Columbia Univ. Press 2003).
21. George Gordon, A Free University, N.Y. Times July 26, 1912, at 8. See Carl Smith Joslyn, 
What Can a Man Afford?, 11 Amer. Econ. Rev. 97, 4, 118 (Supp. 2,1921).
22. Benjamin Soskis, The Problem of Charity in Industrial America, 1873-1915 (Ph.D. diss., 
Columbia Univ., 2010); Zunz, supra note 6, at 17-18.
23. American, supra note 9, at 243-4.
24. Gross, supra note 14, at 31. See also Philanthropy in America: Historicism, supra note 11, at 7-8.
25. Judith Sealander, Curing Evils at their Source: The Arrival of Scientific Giving, in Charity, 
Philanthropy, and Civility in American History, supra note 11, at 218. 
26. American, supra note 9, at 243-4. See Gross, supra note 14, at 39; Sealander, supra note 25, at 
220-1.
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according to policy guidelines.27 The philanthropic detachment necessary for 
the assessment and correction of social problems contrasts with the direct and 
often close relationship between donors and recipients that charity entails. 
Finally, “scientific and businesslike”28 philanthropy prizes effectiveness, 
economy, and efficiency. Thus, the dean of Yale Medical School argued in 
1904: “The general claim that medicine should receive the assistance needed 
. . . for instruction and researchs [sic] [is] of the strongest character in view 
of the beneficent results . . . from the laboratory and hospital researches.”29 
In addition, philanthropy expects its dollars to be used well, as the Yale 
president said of his medical school: “I know of no place in which a man 
desiring to see visible returns from a gift could be assured of better economy 
in its use and more beneficent effect in practice.”30 Consequently, “medicine 
is a good field in which to invest the large amounts necessary to thoroughly 
equip a school.”31 Furthermore, philanthropy requires “efficient organization” 
employing the “functional specialization and centralized coordination and 
administration that characterized the business world.”32 These philanthropic 
attributes were famously summed up by John D. Rockefeller as “the business 
of benevolence.”33 
Many historians today concur with Karl and Katz that the ideology of 
benefaction in the United States gradually shifted from charity to philanthropy, 
noting that “the word ‘charity’ was rapidly disappearing from the public’s 
lexicon” near the beginning of the 20th century34 because of “repugnance 
toward ‘charity in its broad and popular sense.’”35 While differing on the 
timing of the transition, these scholars agree that the eclipse was completed 
by the 1910s, when industrial capitalists endowed new foundations dedicated 
to funding philanthropic approaches to social betterment.36 To be sure, the 
27. Gross, supra note 14, at 44; Sealander, supra note 25, at 223; Foundations, supra note 10, at 1, 5.
28. Roy Lubove, The Professional Altruist: The Emergence of Social Work As a Career, 1180-
1930 7 (Harvard Univ. Press 1965).
29. Herbert E. Smith, Annual Report of the Dean of Yale Medical School 1903-04 147 (Yale 
Univ. 1904). 
30. Arthur T. Hadley, Annual Report of the President of Yale University 1902-03 16 (Yale Univ. 
1903). 
31. Herbert E. Smith, Annual Report of the Dean of Yale Medical School 1908-09 198-9 (Yale 
Univ. 1909). 
32. Lubove, supra note 28, at 6.
33. John D. Rockefeller, Random Reminiscences of Men and Events 184 (Doubleday, Page & 
Co. 1909).
34. Cutlip, supra note 1, at 203-4. Compare Joslyn, supra note 21, at 118; Donileen R. Loseke, ‘The 
Whole Spirit of Modern Philanthropy’: The Construction of the Idea of Charity, 1912-1992, 
44 Social Problems 425, 425-444 (1997).
35. Joslyn, supra note 21, at 118.
36. American, supra note 9, at 243-4; Foundations, supra note 10, at 5; Sealander, supra note 25, at 
218; Cutlip, supra note 1, at 203-4; Zunz, supra note 6, at 2.
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traditional charitable rationale persevered in many sectors in American culture 
and the two ideologies were often entwined.37 But philanthropy triumphed 
broadly in American benefaction and the ideological shift also spread into 
American higher education during the late 19th century and early 20th century 
when universities began to compete for funding and to focus upon amassing 
endowment.38 The preeminent and wealthiest law school in the nation seemed 
perfectly positioned to enter that competition and succeed.
1882 Campaign: The Limits of Charity
In 1881, significant gifts came to Harvard Law School. President Charles 
W. Eliot announced the need for a new building and within a few weeks “a 
friend of the university” privately “informed the president that he desired to 
. . . devote $100,000 to the purpose,” while remaining anonymous.39 Then in 
the fall of 1881, the opportunity to appoint Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to the 
faculty prompted alumnus Louis D. Brandeis and Professor James B. Thayer 
to quietly approach another wealthy Bostonian, who agreed to contribute 
$90,000 anonymously to endow a professorship for Holmes.40 Conforming 
to the charitable tradition that gifts should arise from personal relations and 
avoid attracting attention, such discreet negotiations were customary among 
wealthy benefactors in Boston and the result inspired Thayer to expand the 
range and the rationale of the solicitation.
Thayer began writing personal requests to alumni around the country41 and, 
with Eliot’s help, arranged for Boston newspapers to print stories about the 
school’s need for endowment for scholarships, professorships and the library.42 
Dean C. C. Langdell also issued an extensive analysis and rationale for giving 
to law schools in his annual report in early January 1882. Although the library 
was mentioned most often by Thayer, the ensuing informal drive announced 
several purposes and Langdell’s nine-page statement aimed primarily at 
justifying gifts for scholarships.43 Eliot summarized Langdell’s reasoning in his 
accompanying annual report and referred the reader to the dean’s statement 
37. See Charity Old and New, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1917.
38. Bruce A. Kimball & Benjamin A. Johnson, The Discovery of Endowment in American 
Higher Education, 1900-1930, 114 Teachers College Record 1, 1-32 (2012); Roger L. Geiger, 
To Advance Knowledge: The Growth of American Research Universities, 1900-1940 58-93 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1986).
39. Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report of the President of Harvard College 1880-81 26 (1881). 
40. James B. Thayer, Memoranda Books, v. 3, at 103-07, [Jan. 1882] (on file with Harvard Law 
School Library Special Collections).
41. Id. at 108. See James B. Thayer Papers at boxes 19, 20 (1881-82) (on file with Harvard Law 
School Library, Special Collections).
42. The Law School at Cambridge, Boston Advertiser, Jan. 18, 1882; The Law School at 
Cambridge, Boston Evening Post, Jan. 24, 1882; letter from C. W. Ernst to Charles W. Eliot 
(Jan. 14, 1882) (on file with Harvard Univ. Archives); letter from Charles W. Eliot to James 
B. Thayer (Jan. 14, 1882) (on file with Harvard Univ. Archives).
43. C. C. Langdell, Annual Report of the Dean of Harvard Law School 1880-81 78-86 (1881).
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for “full discussion of this subject and of the true conception of professional 
education in a university.”44
Langdell began by observing that in the United States “money has seldom 
been given . . . for the promotion of legal or medical education” and he located 
the root cause in the preference of Oxford and Cambridge Universities for 
“academic,” or liberal arts, education and their depreciation of professional 
education. American colleges had blindly followed this tradition, according 
to Langdell, without recognizing that England provided financial support 
for legal education in various indirect ways. Having identified and rebutted 
this historical cause, the dean then turned to “the most plausi ble arguments 
against the claims of professional, and especially legal, education to pecuniary 
encouragement and support.”45 He partly adopted and partly conceded 
certain charitable points, while broaching philanthropic arguments in his 
rebuttal. Langdell’s statement thus reflects an early phase of the ideological 
shift discussed above.
First, although Langdell argued generally for gifts for legal education, he 
did not treat law schools as the recipients. Instead, he analyzed support for 
legal education in terms of students who benefit in the form of scholarships. 
Thus, he adopted the terms of charity as his unit of analysis. Next, Langdell 
identified two central charitable objections to providing scholarships. On the 
one hand, law students do not deserve gifts because they pay tuition “for their 
own advancement in life.” On the other hand, law students who are college 
graduates are not really in need because “a young man who has received a 
good college education ought to be able to make his own way.” In either case, 
such students do not deserve charity because they do not incur a debt from 
which they need to be rescued, according to this rationale. Any debt incurred 
for tuition is an investment or a debt they can afford. To the former objection, 
Langdell never replied; to the latter, he argued that Harvard’s new higher 
standard of legal education was more expensive and required more work and 
so a college graduate could not reasonably be expected to find a job to pay 
for it.46 In this fashion, he partly adopted, partly conceded and partly rebutted 
points framed in the traditional ideology of charity.
In addition, Langdell attempted to invoke the inchoate philanthropic 
ideology by defending legal scholarships for their broad, long-term benefit 
to the public. First, providing scholarships would allow law schools to raise 
academic standards, alleviating the problem “that there are too many lawyers 
already and that the interest of the public lies in reducing their number.” 
Second, providing scholarships would allow students to study longer and 
more intensively and develop a more sophisticated understanding of law “with 
which the most vital inter ests of the public and the state are closely bound 
44. Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report of the President of Harvard College 1881-82 17 (1882).
45. Langdell, Annual Report of the Dean of Harvard Law School 1880-81, supra note 43, at 79, 
82.
46. Id. at 82-83.
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up.” Here Langdell took for granted that stronger legal training and expertise 
provide greater social benefit. Third, beyond reducing the number of lawyers 
and increasing their expertise, scholarships would improve the quality of those 
entering the bar “by raising the standard of legal attainments, education and 
character in the men [from] whom the profession is recruited.”47 Thus, the 
public would be served if law students and lawyers were drawn from a better 
class of people.
Nevertheless, Langdell did not expect these arguments about public benefit 
to convince lay benefactors, commensurate with the undeveloped nature of 
philanthropic ideology. “Perhaps no one but a member of the legal profession 
can be expected to take sufficient interest in the subject.” Hence, he concluded 
that lawyers can aid the public by improving their own profession through 
endowing legal scholarships. “By devoting money to such an object, one can 
serve the public in the most attractive of all ways, namely, by conferring signal 
benefits upon a perpetual succession of worthy individuals.”48 Thus, lawyers 
who endow legal scholarships will enjoy both a better profession and a better 
society.
In the weeks following Langdell’s public statement, Thayer’s drive 
began auspiciously. He recruited recent graduates to solicit in New York, 
Philadelphia, Chicago and San Francisco49 and a total of about $40,000 was 
promised by early March.50 At that point the pace of giving slowed to a crawl. 
“In fact, the whole outlook seems to me rather hopeless at present,” wrote 
one young alumnus.51 Undeterred, Thayer composed an appeal that was 
signed by seven prominent alumni, printed as a two-page circular and sent to 
Harvard Law alumni in Boston and New York City, the two major financial 
centers that were expected to provide most of the contributions. The circular 
proclaimed that the goal “should be not less than sixty thousand dollars and 
might . . . be increased to eighty thousand.”52 Yet, over the next few months 
gifts only trickled in and none exceeded a few hundred dollars. When Thayer 
relinquished the effort during the summer, the total had reached $47,000, and 
nearly 75 percent of that came from two gifts. So, the vast majority of the law 
47. Id. at 81-83. See id. at 84-85.
48. Id. at 85.
49. Letter from John O. Sargent to James B. Thayer (Apr. 30, 1882); letter from George F. 
Canfield to James B. Thayer (Apr. 19, 1882); letter from J. S. Rosengarten to James B. 
Thayer (Apr. 24 & 27, 1882), in James B. Thayer Papers, supra note 41, at box 20; letter from 
William Thomas to James B. Thayer (Jan. 30, 1882), in James B. Thayer Papers, supra note 
41, at box 19.
50. Thayer, Memoranda Books, supra note 40, at 108; letter from George Shattuck to James B. 
Thayer (Feb. 16, 1882); letter from Henry Villard to James B. Thayer (Mar. 11, 1882), in James 
B. Thayer Papers, supra note 41, at box 19.
51. Letter from Victor Morawetz to James B. Thayer (Mar. 27, 1882), in James B. Thayer Papers, 
Special Collections, Harvard Law School Library, box 20. See correspondence in folder.
52. Sargent, supra note 3. See letter from Victor Morawetz to James B. Thayer (Mar. 31, 1882), in 
James B. Thayer Papers, supra note 41, at box 20.
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school’s alumni had not contributed significantly. Several earning $10,000 to 
$20,000 annually in legal practice in New York City contributed only token 
amounts.53
Extant testimony about the refusal to give is rare. But it appears, on the one 
hand, that alumni were not attuned to the philanthropic terms of Langdell’s 
appeal, whether or not they read it. “The benefits received [by the public] 
are not sufficiently apparent to the unprofessional mind to interest them in 
the school,” wrote one from Salem, Massachusetts.54 On the other hand, the 
alumni most often framed their objections in terms of charity. They maintained 
that law students did not deserve help. “I am unable to see why . . . the means 
of breadwinning . . . should not be paid for by the recipient,” wrote another 
from Boston.55 Or the needs of law students did not move them. One recent 
graduate reported to Thayer that “he approached several of his friends who 
were men of means, but that the reception he received was positively chilling.”56 
Another, visiting Chicago, “found, on coming into close contact with the old 
gentlemen . . . the hard stuff they are made of.”57
Most revealing was a meeting of wealthy alumni convened in New York 
City in April 1882 by John O. Sargent, one of Thayer’s allies. Sargent invited 
to the gathering several men who had signed Thayer’s circular. He planned for 
the signees to testify enthusiastically to the cause and persuade the prospects 
to contribute. Instead, “to my astonishment,” Sargent found that some of the 
signees, particularly James C. Carter, a leading member of the bar in New York 
City, “vehemently—not to say venomously—opposed . . . the whole plan.”58 
Their reasons, according to a witness, “are that it is against the interests of 
the university to go beg for money and that it has never been done before.” 
Here the request was framed in the ideology of charity: the law school was 
a beggar in need, humbling itself before benefactors and “creat[ing] an 
unpleasant feeling in the community, which will be harmful” to the school 
in the long run.59 Instead, the law school “should wait till the spirit moved 
53. Eliot, Annual Report of the President of Harvard College 1881-82, supra note 44, at 30; letter 
from Victor Morawetz to James B. Thayer (Apr. 5, 1882), in James B. Thayer Papers, supra 
note 41, at box 20; Thayer, Memoranda Books, supra note 40 at 108; Shattuck to Thayer, supra 
note 50; Letter from Villard to Thayer, supra note 50.
54. Letter from Arthur S. Huntington to James B. Thayer (Jan. 24, 1882), in James B. Thayer 
Papers, supra note 41, at box 19.
55. Letter from Francis W. Palfrey to James B. Thayer (Jan. 31, 1882), in James B. Thayer Papers, 
supra note 41, at box 19.
56. Letter from Morawetz to Thayer, supra note 41.
57. Letter from Canfield to Thayer, supra note 49.
58. Letter from John O. Sargent to James B. Thayer (Apr. 15, 1882), in James B. Thayer Papers, 
supra note 41, at box 20.
59. Letter from Victor Morawetz to James B. Thayer (Apr. 15, 1882), in James B. Thayer Papers, 
supra note 41, at box 20.
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someone to give a large sum—fifty years hence or more.”60 Carter, in fact, 
bequeathed $100,000 to endow a professorship at the school two decades later, 
so he was not a cheapskate. Nor was he a “mugwump” who could not make up 
his mind on this issue.61 Rather, he and his fellow wealthy alumni interpreted 
benefaction in terms of charity, which was beneath their dignity. Sargent 
“replied that there is no intention to beg.”62 However, “Carter’s opposition 
was persistent and uncompromising and exceedingly damaging to the cause,” 
lamented Sargent.63 In 1882, it seemed evident that most HLS alumni were 
repulsed by charitable appeals and deaf to philanthropic appeals and that law 
schools would remain “The Worst Endowed of All the Great Departments of Professional 
Education,” as Thayer’s circular had warned.64
The significance of the problem grew during subsequent decades as the 
standards of legal education gradually rose, exemplified by the founding 
of the Association of American Law Schools in 1900. Raising academic 
standards costs money and the paucity of financial resources in legal education 
increasingly influenced the standing and strength of the profession. In 1882, 
Thayer’s pamphlet had observed that the Harvard Law endowment fund was 
“a little over $48,000 . . . the Divinity School fund at over $300,000 . . . and 
the Medical School fund . . . at nearly $119,000.”65 As of 1900 it was reported 
that the aggregate endowment of theological schools in the nation was about 
nine times larger than that of medical schools and 18 times larger than that of 
law schools.66 By 1914 the aggregate endowment of theological schools was 
nearly $40,700,000 compared to $20,050,000 for medical schools, and merely 
$2,276,000 for law schools. Medical schools had closed the gap considerably 
while law schools still straggled far behind, as the law deans of Yale and 
Harvard lamented in the mid-1910s.67 
Indeed, by that point even the best endowed universities were adopting 
tuition dependence as policy for their law schools but not for other 
professional schools. At Yale, President Arthur T. Hadley declared in 1914, “the 
60. Letter from Sargent to Thayer, supra note 58.
61. Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report of the President of Harvard College 1905-06 52-53 (1906). 
See Lewis A. Grossman, James Coolidge Carter and Mugwump Jurisprudence, 20 Law and 
History Rev. 577, 577-629 (2002). 
62. Letter from Morawetz to Thayer, supra note 59.
63. Letter from Sargent to Thayer, supra note 58.
64. Sargent, supra note 3.
65. Id. 
66. James R. Parsons, Jr., Professional Education, Monographs on Education in the United 
States 17 (1900).
67. Henry W. Rogers, Annual Report of the Dean of the Yale Law School 1914-15 320-1 (1915); 
Thomas W. Swan, Annual Report of the Dean of Yale Law School 1916-17 309 (1917); letter 
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best institutions of the United States are abandoning the practice of having 
professional schools supported by tuition fees alone.” However, he continued,
the need for this change is felt with different intensity in different lines. It is 
frequently possible to support a first-rate law school, taught by men of real 
eminence, from the fees of the students. This is partly because law students 
see a lucrative profession not far ahead and can therefore afford to pay high 
fees for good instruction and partly because law is a subject in which large 
classes can be taught almost as well as small ones, so that a single efficient 
teacher can command the fees of a large number of interested pupils.68
A decade earlier, Eliot had reached the same conclusion: that law schools 
are the only professional schools that do not need endowment.69
1917 Campaign: Toward a Philanthropic Rationale
As educational standards in the legal profession rose between 1882 and the 
Harvard Law centennial in 1917, a number of factors contributed to shifting 
the meaning and justification of benefaction in American higher education 
away from charity and toward philanthropy. Prior to 1865 the U.S. economy 
did not produce enough surplus wealth to support significant benefactions 
and most gifts were made for current use.70 Between 1870 and 1920, the 
U.S. gross national product grew more than six-fold, as a revolution in 
the areas of transportation, communication and manufacturing sparked a 
great economic expansion.71 Commensurately, large industrial corporations 
emerged, producing an unprecedented number of millionaires and multi-
millionaires, who contributed to an enormous increase in benefaction, most 
of which flowed into higher education. Particularly prominent was Andrew 
Carnegie, who founded the Carnegie Institution of Washington in 1902, 
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in 1905, and 
the Carnegie Corporation of New York in 1911. Even more influential was 
oil magnate John D. Rockefeller, who endowed the Rockefeller Institute 
of Medical Research in 1901, the General Education Board in 1903, and the 
Rockefeller Foundation in 1913.72 In addition to expanding the resources for 
benefaction, these new entities cultivated the ideology of philanthropy.
68. Arthur T. Hadley, Annual Report of the President of Yale University 1913-14 13-14 (1914).
69. Bruce A. Kimball, Impoverishing “the greatest law school in the world”: the Financial 
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James Thayer demonstrated the shift toward philanthropy in an often-cited 
address to the meeting of the American Bar Association in 1895. Doubtlessly 
reflecting on his experience in 1882, Thayer attempted to reframe what he 
called “charity” for law schools in the emerging ideology of philanthropy. 
Thayer began with the analogical argument that all “the great parts of 
human knowledge” are “alike bene ficial” and “these subjects should be 
investigated with the deepest research and the most searching critical study.” 
Furthermore, in these fields of knowledge, “the highest education always 
means endowment; the schools which give it are all charity schools. . . . If 
they are not [endowed], then the managers [of the schools] must . . . consult 
the market and consider what [students] will pay; they will bid for numbers 
of students instead of excellence of work.” Now, law is one of those “great 
parts of human knowledge;” therefore, “our law must be studied and taught 
as other great sciences are studied and taught at the universities, as deeply, by 
like methods, and . . . [by] a learned and studious faculty.” It also follows that 
“our law schools must be en dowed as our colleges are endowed.”73
Having made this analogical argument for endowment, Thayer then 
elaborated on the broad, long-term “beneficial” character of legal study, 
which makes it deserving of philanthropy. Amplifying Langdell’s argument 
on behalf of student aid, Thayer proposed that legal education benefits 
the public by way of its three kinds of students: “First of all, those who, for 
any reason, propose to master these subjects. . . . Second, . . . the leaders in 
the practical application of these branches of knowledge to human affairs. 
Third, . . . all practitioners of these subjects . . . who wish to understand their 
business and to do it thoroughly well.” But Thayer did not explain or provide 
evidence of the beneficial influence of these three kinds of students or how 
better legal education would improve that influence. Instead, he invoked an 
English authority who maintained that “there is no other class or order in the 
community . . . on whom so much of human happiness depends, or whose 
pursuits and studies are so intimately connected with the progress and well-
being of mankind” than lawyers.74
Adding a philanthropic dimension to Langdell’s argument, Thayer then 
addressed legal scholarship in terms of “the use of it and its necessity,” 
particularly given the “widespread skepticism among a certain class of practical 
men, in and out of our profession.” Consider other fields, he said. Such 
skepticism formerly prevailed about “what seemed to a majority of mankind 
useless and unpractical study and experiment” in electricity, chemistry, 
physics, physiology, geology and other natural and technical subjects. Yet, 
these studies yielded practical and technological benefits such as “the steam-
engine, the telegraph, the telephone, the electric railway and the electric light, 
the telescope, the improved lighthouse, the lucifer match, antiseptic surgery, 
& Nash, supra note 6, at 91, 110, 164, 211.
73. James B. Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at Universities, 9 Harv. Law Rev. 173, 174, 184 
(1895).
74. Id. at 174, 172.
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the prophylactics against small-pox and diphtheria, aluminum the new metal, 
and the triumphs of modern engineering.”75 Consequently, the complexity and 
obscurity of research does not obviate its public benefit.
Now, jurisprudence is also obscure and complex because common law lies 
“in an immense mass of judicial decisions.” These cases have yielded “certain 
inherited principles, formulas and customs and certain rules and maxims of 
good sense and of an ever-developing sense of justice.” Therefore, advanced 
legal study or research is necessary and useful and it entails investigation 
of “600 years” of English legal history and beyond to the Middle Ages and 
Roman law.76 In this way, Thayer seemed to commit the fallacy that obscurity 
and complexity of scholarship is not only compatible with public benefit, but 
indicative of it.
Attentive to the philanthropic demand for efficiency and economy, Thayer 
then addressed the objection: “‘What is the use of carrying on our backs this 
enormous load of the Common Law?’ Let us codify and be rid of all this by 
enacting what we need and re pealing the rest.” But, Thayer rejoined, “I have 
never seen any attempt at codification . . . which was not plainly marked by grave 
and disqualifying defects.” According to his personal experience, the common 
law could not be made more efficient without sacrificing its effectiveness. In 
any case, he added, legal reform and codification would require the expertise 
of legal scholars. Beyond that personal testimony, Thayer never presented an 
example of how research in common law did or could contribute to better 
decisions on practical legal questions. Nor did he specify or explain the benefit 
to the public from legal scholarship. In conclusion, he lamented that “the 
scientific systematic study of law” is still “scorned or depreciated by many,” 
quoting Frederick Pollock.77
Though lacking validation and specificity, Thayer’s argument advanced in 
philanthropic terms beyond Langdell’s in at least two ways. Thayer advocated 
benefaction less because of its direct assistance for individual students and 
professionals and more because it strengthened law schools as institutions by 
decreasing dependence on tuition through increasing endowment. Thayer’s 
emphasis here was precisely that adopted in the early 1910s by the Rockefeller-
endowed General Education Board through its cardinal policy of aiming for 
the “concentration of gifts in the form of endowment.”78 
Furthermore, while Langdell had viewed law as a “noble science” of equal 
rank with any other, Thayer went further and explicitly addressed the potential 
of legal scholarship to benefit the public, analogous to other academic fields. 
By this approach, benefactions to endow law schools were conceived as 
investments yielding widespread social improvement, consistent with the 
75. Id. at 174.
76. Id. at 175, 178.
77. Id. at 181, 182.
78. The General Education Board: An Account of its Activities, 1902-1914, 143 (General Edu. 
Board 1915). See id. at 3-17.
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emergent philanthropic reasoning. Because of this incipient philanthropic 
approach, Thayer’s statement continued to be quoted two decades later during 
the planning of the first formal fundraising campaign in legal education, 
organized around the HLS centennial.79 
In the mid-1910s the deans and alumni leaders began organizing a campaign 
that would address “the hazardous dependence on necessarily fluctuating 
tuition fees”80 and the need to secure gifts for “an adequate endowment.”81 
The first to fully appreciate and publicly announce this financial dependence 
was Ezra R. Thayer, the son of James B. Thayer, who left private practice in 
Boston to become Harvard Law dean in 1910.82 After realizing the importance 
of endowment and failing in several attempts to raise money, Dean Thayer 
welcomed a proposal in 1914 from the New York alumni association to organize 
a campaign in recognition of the school’s centennial in 1917.83 
Though novel in legal education, this campaign was preceded by the 
increasing number and size of fundraising efforts in higher education during 
the early 1900s. These culminated in the university’s Harvard Endowment 
Fund (HEF) campaign that ran from 1915 to 1925. This was the first full-fledged, 
multi-year drive in higher education, hiring full-time staff and enlisting 3,000 
volunteers to raise some $14 million from 36,000 alumni around the world.84
The contemporaneous Harvard Law centennial campaign failed miserably, 
however, for several reasons. Harvard President A. L. Lowell was never 
enthusiastic and late in 1915 Dean Thayer committed suicide. His successor, 
Roscoe Pound, did not actively engage alumni volunteers, who dithered 
and delayed and refrained from direct personal solicitation. When hostilities 
broke out in Europe, broad solicitations for disaster relief began to compete 
with other fundraising. In April 1917, the United States entered World War 
I, halting the centennial campaign. Meanwhile, throughout the period from 
1915 to 1920, the law school encountered stiff competition from the university’s 
79. See News and Views, 16 Harvard Alumni Bulletin 445 (Apr. 8, 1914); letter from Ezra R. 
Thayer to Mark A. D. Howe (Mar. 28, 1914), in Dean Thayer Correspondence Subject Files, 
at box 1 (on file with Harvard Univ. Archives, Harvard Law School Dean’s Office Records).
80. Austin W. Scott, Annual Report of the Dean of Harvard Law School 1914-15 149 (1915).
81. William C. Loring, James Byrne & William Church Osborn, To the Graduates of the 
Harvard Law School (Mar. 31, 1917) (on file with Harvard Law School Library, Special 
Collections). See Report of the Dean of the Law School, 16 Harvard Alumni Bulletin 448 
(Apr. 8, 1914); Roscoe Pound, Annual Report of the Dean of Harvard Law School 1915-16 
145 (1916).
82. Ezra R. Thayer, Annual Report of the Dean of Harvard Law School 1912-13 126-7 (1913). See 
Kimball, supra note 69, at 4-29. 
83. Kimball, Disastrous First Fundraising Campaign, supra note 2. 
84. Bruce A. Kimball, The First Campaign and the Paradoxical Transformation of Fundraising 
in American Higher Education, 1915-1925, 114 Teachers College Record (forthcoming 2014); 
Cutlip, supra note 1, at 169-74; Seymour E. Harris, Economics of Harvard 298-99 (McGraw 
Hill 1970).
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HEF drive because many law graduates had a stronger attachment to their 
college than to the law school. 
While contributing to the campaign’s failure, these factors stemmed from 
the lethargy, apathy and pessimism that suffused alumni from the start. Those 
attitudes were rooted in the fundamental problem that graduates, former 
students and lay citizens were never convinced of a reason to give to the law 
school. Their extant testimony, though scarce, echoes the objections identified 
by Langdell in 1882: law students neither need help nor deserve help and gifts 
merely worsen the overcrowding of the bar.85 These views reflect the ideology of 
charity, in which Dean Thayer and the campaign executive committee largely 
framed the justification of their requests, despite the philanthropic arguments 
of the dean’s father.
Thayer observed that “one feels some embarrassment about a public wail 
concerning the poverty of his institution.” Financial need was not characteristic 
of a respectable institution, the dean implied, and soliciting funds was 
“begging” to be done quietly and privately.86 The executive committee adopted 
similar terms in its primary published statement mailed to all alumni. The 
school needed help to get back on its feet. Costs had risen and “the gifts it has 
received . . . have not been many.” Like the deserving poor, the school merited 
assistance, because the problem “is not from any weakness in the school or 
its faculty. The difficulty is due to lack of money.” And “this school, without 
a peer in the past and with the certainty of realizing a future equal to its past, 
should have an adequate endowment for carrying on its work.” Furthermore, 
“[t]he teaching force is seriously overworked. . . . That the officers of the school 
should carry burdens sufficient, as in Dean Thayer’s case, to cause a complete 
breakdown, should not be expected by the profession and by the alumni.” 
Moreover, the school had a close personal relationship with its alumni “for 
whose benefit the school exists.” Alumni should affectionately bestow “an 
adequate endowment . . . as a birthday present at its centennial celebration.”87
In closing, this statement mentioned that the school also served “the use of 
the profession and the world,” and referred the reader to Dean Roscoe Pound’s 
annual report for 1915-16, which was reprinted and appended.88 Successor 
to Dean Thayer, Pound provided the primary published rationale for the 
centennial campaign through this report, whose language and arguments were 
largely repeated in the concluding chapter of The Centennial History of the Harvard 
85. See letter from Edmund K. Arnold to Ezra R. Thayer (June 20, 1914), in Ezra Ripley Thayer 
Papers, box 8, f. 13 (on file with Harvard Law School Library, Special Collections); Letter 
from Archibald King to Joseph Sargent (Mar. 6, 1914); letter from Horace F. Baker to Joseph 
Sargent (Mar. 4, 1914); letter from Alvin A. Morris to Horace F. Baker (Mar. 5, 1914); letter 
from Justin Bowersock to Joseph Sargent (June 17, 1914), in Ezra Ripley Thayer Papers, 
supra, at box 8, f. 11.
86. Letter from Thayer to Howe, supra note 79.
87. Loring, Byrne & Osborn, supra note 81.
88. Pound, Annual Report of the Dean of Harvard Law School 1915-16, supra note 81, at 140-50.
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Law School.89 Pound then incorporated much of the arguments and the language 
of his 1915-16 report in “The Harvard Law School,” a pamphlet disseminated 
to all alumni in a failed attempt to revive the campaign after World War I.90 
Commensurate with the ideological shift in American benefaction and with 
Pound’s “sociological jurisprudence,”91 these three documents launched a 
philanthropic rationale for giving to a university law school.
Pound’s central thesis was that giving to the law school provides support 
for work that is “useful socially” and results in “solving social problems” and 
“securing . . . social interests.”92 In this regard, Pound went beyond Thayer’s 
analogies to medicine and technology and attempted to explain the return 
on giving to legal education. In addition, Pound appealed in terms of the 
business of benevolence, arguing that donating to legal education “gives 
greater promise of results . . . than any other form of investment in educational 
enterprises which is at present open.”93 
The social benefit of legal research and graduate instruction, according to 
Pound, lay primarily in reconciling new legal developments in the 20th century 
with received legal doctrine. Legal scholarship turns “the [common] law of 
the [19th] century . . . to intelligent account as an agency of justice in the [20th] 
century.”94 For example, Pound cited Harvard Law professors advising on new 
legislation: “the work of Professor Williston, as one of the Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, on the Sales Act, the Warehouse Receipts Act, the Bill 
of Lading Act and the Certificates of Stock Act [is] especially noteworthy.”95 
An even larger need arises in “the body of law which is growing up outside of 
courts” in “administrative boards and commissions” in the early 20th century, 
such as the “Interstate Commerce Commission . . . public service commissions 
of one sort or another . . . [the] Federal Trade Commission . . . [and] boards 
of probation or parole.”96 
89. Harvard Law School Assoc., The Centennial History of the Harvard Law School, 1817-1917 
vi, 162-174 (Harvard Law School Assoc. 1918) [hereinafter Centennial History].
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Assimilating these entities and developments in new legal fields requires 
more than either the layman’s “unfettered common sense” or training “merely 
in the political and social sciences.” Legal research and graduate instruction 
are needed because “in the end, the lawyer will be called upon to formulate 
in legal principles the results of administrative experience.”97 For example, 
“reconciliation of the new principles behind our workmen’s compensation 
acts with the general law of torts is a pressing problem.”98 Conversely, the new 
administrative boards and commissions and their associated legislation create 
problems “in the older fields” of law. Legal scholarship needed to address 
these problems as well.99 
The absence of jurisprudential foundation for new doctrine and the 
discontinuity between new and old doctrine were the fundamental problems, 
in Pound’s view. Reconciliation of 20th century developments with 19th 
century jurisprudence was the solution. The social benefit lay in meeting “the 
exigencies of general peace and good order” and “the paramount social interest 
in the general security,” Pound said.100 These benefits demonstrate that “the 
study of the common law, as carried on at Harvard, is conservative in the best 
sense of that word. . . . To teach the experience of English-speaking peoples 
in the administration of justice . . . is one of the surest ways of perpetuating 
American institutions, dispelling plausible political crudities and insuring a 
sane and orderly legal and political development.”101 Pound thus advanced the 
incipient philanthropic rationale advanced by James Thayer. But his approach 
also raised questions.
Notwithstanding the progressive jurisprudence attributed to Zechariah 
Chafee, Felix Frankfurter, Brandeis, Pound and other Harvard Law faculty 
and alumni,102 the dean’s appeals to “the exigencies of general peace and good 
order” and “the paramount social interest in the general security” seemed to 
side with the interests of industrial capitalism and the wealthy. His argument 
thus reinforced the popular complaint voiced by Theodore Roosevelt at an 
earlier Harvard fundraising dinner: “many of the most influential and most 
highly remunerated members of the bar . . . work out bold and ingenious 
schemes by which their very wealthy clients, individual or corporate, can 
evade the laws which . . . regulate, in the interest of the public, the use of great 
Centennial History, supra note 89, at 166; The Harvard Law School, supra note 90, at 13-15.
97. Pound, Annual Report of the Dean of Harvard Law School 1915-16, supra note 81, at 141. See 
Centennial History, supra note 89, at 166-7; The Harvard Law School, supra note 90, at 14-15.
98. Centennial History, supra note 89, at 167-8. See The Harvard Law School, supra note 90, at 9.
99. Pound, Annual Report of the Dean of Harvard Law School 1915-16, supra note 81, at 141. See 
Centennial History, supra note 89, at 167.
100. The Harvard Law School, supra note 90, at 14-15. Pound, Annual Report of the Dean of 
Harvard Law School 1915-16, supra note 81, at 141; Centennial History, supra note 89, at 166-7.
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wealth. Now, the great lawyer who employs his talent and his learning [in this 
way] . . . encourage[s] the growth in this country of a spirit of dumb anger 
against all laws and of disbelief in their efficacy.”103
But if Pound’s appeal favored the wealthy, they did not see the law as 
their ally. Even if law’s efforts at “solving social problems” were tailored 
for “conservative” interests, those interests doubted law’s effectiveness. 
Businessmen did not see law or lawyers as constructive allies. Hence, Pound’s 
philanthropic rationale could scarcely persuade wealthy business interests. He 
faced the profound difficulty that, for either progressive or conservative donors, 
“dissatisfaction with law and distrust of lawyers are no less marked than a 
century ago. Social conditions and industrial conflicts have made more than 
one tenet of our legal system unpopular and have roused strong opposition 
to the fundamental dogma of the supremacy of law,” as the Centennial History 
acknowledged in 1917.104 
Yet, Pound’s three documents assumed that readers credited the social 
benefit of law in the past and, therefore, the value of reconciling new law with 
the old. Contrary to public perception, Pound took it for granted that the 
law school’s “very effectiveness in handling the law of the [19th] century is a 
guarantee of ability to turn this law to intelligent account as an agency of 
justice in the [20th] century.”105
Finally, even if public “dissatisfaction with the law and distrust of lawyers” 
could somehow be assuaged, was legal research deserving of more, or as 
much, support as medical research? The new philanthropic foundations were 
potential sources of bountiful aid. Alumni leaders of the centennial campaign 
wistfully observed that “the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations would be 
institutions to be appealed to in the best way possible.”106 Pound initiated 
requests in this regard.107 But the bulk of foundation support within higher 
education went to medical research and education108 and Pound discovered 
that the foundation staff expected funded projects to produce direct tangible 
benefits like medical improvements in “individual hygiene.”109 
103. High Ideals Urged On All, Boston Globe, June 29, 1905, at 5.
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The fundamental difficulty here was that legal scholarship did not fit the 
“scientific naturalism” that suited medical science and became the dominant 
paradigm of knowledge in American culture and academe by the 1910s, 
suffusing the social sciences as well.110 Into legal thought, it has been argued, 
“scientific naturalism entered, first as sociological jurisprudence, then as legal 
realism.”111 But Pound, perhaps because of his scientific training in botany, 
took for granted the autonomy and distinctiveness of jurisprudence apart from 
expertise either in the natural sciences or “merely in the political and social 
sciences.”112 His 1919 pamphlet maintained the distinction while arguing that 
“criminal law is our main reliance for the securing of social interests.”113 
Pound had long devoted attention to problems in criminal law. In the 
academic year 1915-16 he cited criminal law and procedure prominently among 
the objects of legal research and graduate instruction.114 During 1916-17, he 
solicited an endowed chair in criminal law, even to the point of interfering with 
the plans of the centennial campaign’s executive committee.115 In 1919, he said 
that “no subject calls more urgently for . . . study,” by which he meant “study 
which the Harvard Law School has been able to devote to legal problems in 
the past.”116 He offered no rapprochement with scientific naturalism.
As a result—whether in regard to legislation, administrative law, or criminal 
law—Pound’s three documents did little to validate lawyers’ “securing of 
social interests.” He cited a few examples of issues on which legal scholarship 
might yield tangible benefits to society. But he did not explain how this would 
happen and did not identify benefits beyond social stability. In support of the 
point, he cited grandly and vaguely the law’s past accomplishments, which 
few of the laity credited.
The non-lawyer could immediately understand the improvement wrought 
by “the steam-engine, the telegraph, the telephone, . . . the prophylactics 
against small pox and diphtheria.” But how did the legal research of Professor 
Williston, if he employed any, improve the Warehouse Receipts Act beyond 
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what “unfettered common sense” could have done? How would reconciling 
the “workmen’s compensation acts with the general law of torts” solve social 
problems? How did the “rational development” provided by lawyers improve 
upon those trained “merely in the political and social sciences?” Pound did 
not explain, demonstrate or provide evidence of the benefits of legal research.
By its conclusion in June, 1920, the centennial campaign raised less than a 
quarter of its goal of $1 million, and only about 2 percent of the 8,700 living 
former students contributed.117 This dismal outcome and failed drive were 
evidently considered best forgotten, since no reference to them appears in the 
subsequent records of Harvard Law School fundraising.
1925-27 Campaign: Tactical Problems
In January 1920, the Eighteenth Amendment prohibiting the sale of 
“intoxicating liquors” took effect, and ensuing attempts to evade Prohibition 
contributed to a national “crime wave” that attracted increasing publicity and 
concern.118 In response, the Cleveland Foundation invited Pound to conduct 
a survey of urban crime and criminal justice to provide understanding of 
the growing problem. He and Felix Frankfurter assembled a team of legally 
trained social scientists who produced the path-breaking Cleveland Crime 
Survey in 1922. Pound’s summary of this study emphasized that sociological 
and psychological factors contribute to criminal activity119 and reinforced his 
interest in studying criminal law. 
Meanwhile, fundraising campaigns proliferated throughout higher 
education, prompted by the national publicity given to the Harvard 
Endowment Fund drive. As that campaign was winding down early in 1920, 
the New York Times reported that “nearly seventy-five colleges throughout 
the country are conducting campaigns” seeking more than $200 million.120 
Concurrently, various Harvard departments began clamoring to raise money 
and the governing board agreed in 1921 to run a quiet campaign to raise $10 
million for the business school, the chemistry department and the fine arts 
department.121 As during the HEF drive, the university seemed oblivious to the 
financial needs of its law school and Pound grew extremely frustrated that the 
new appeal did not include HLS.122 
117. Kimball, supra note 2.
118. Henry S. Ruth & Kevin R. Reitz, The Challenge of Crime: Rethinking Our Response 15 
(Harvard Univ. Press 2003).
119. Wigdor, supra note 91, at 241-5; Hull, supra note 91, at 154.
120. Universities Ask Over $200,000,000, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1920, at E1.
121. A. L. Lowell, Annual Report of the President of Harvard University 1922-23, at 26-29 (1923); 
A. L. Lowell, Annual Report of the President of Harvard University 1923-1924, at 27-29 
(1924). See Commencement Gifts, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1924, at 18; Lawrence, supra note 20, 
at 417-20.
122. Letter from A. L. Lowell to Roscoe Pound (July 20, 1925); letter from Roscoe Pound to A. 
L. Lowell (July 22, 1925); letter from Roscoe Pound to W. M. Powell (Nov. 24, 1926 and Jan. 
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Nevertheless, he began to identify and announce the school’s problematic 
syndrome of insufficient endowment to support expenses beyond teaching 
LL.B. students, of dependence on tuition, and of resultant overcrowding, 
though he did not appreciate the danger of diverting resources into building 
or incurring debt.123 Lowell also began to cite the needs of Harvard Law School 
in his annual reports, and late in 1924 the governing board agreed to support a 
fundraising drive for the law school as soon as the business-chemistry-fine arts 
appeal was completed.124 “The embargo has now been lifted,” Pound exulted, 
and rapidly pushed to organize a campaign.125 As events would show, Pound 
underestimated the effort required and overestimated the amount that could 
be raised. Both of these miscalculations resulted from his excessive confidence 
in the persuasive power of his philanthropic rationales.
Pound proposed raising $5 million, including $3 million in endowment 
and $2 million for buildings.126 The governing board and various university 
officials advised that no more than $3 million was achievable but Pound 
ignored the advice.127 In fact, he added another $400,000 for immediate 
purposes. And, six months later, enthused when new buildings were erected for 
the University of Michigan Law School, Pound suggested that an additional 
million dollars could be raised for another building.128 In the summer of 1925, 
he envisioned raising nearly $6.4 million, although at least one prominent 
law school alumnus and member of the governing board warned that the 
11, 1927), in Correspondence regarding endowment funds 1919-1927, Harvard Law School 
Dean’s Office Records, at box 2 (on file with Harvard Univ. Archives). 
123. Roscoe Pound, Annual Report of the Dean of Harvard Law School 1923-24 181-85 
(1924); Roscoe Pound to Charles H. Strong (Dec. 13, 1925), in Correspondence regarding 
endowment funds 1919-1927, Harvard Law School Dean’s Office Records, supra note 122, at 
box 2.
124. Lowell, Annual Report of the President of Harvard University 1923-24, supra note 121, at 15-
16; A. L. Lowell, Annual Report of the President of Harvard University 1924-25 21-22 (1925); 
A. L. Lowell, Annual Report of the President of Harvard University 1925-26 23-24 (1926); 
letter from Roscoe Pound to A. L. Lowell (Jan. 14, 1925); letter from Roscoe Pound to Julian 
W. Mack (Nov. 26, 1924); letter from Roscoe Pound to John P. Nields (Nov. 28, 1924), in 
Correspondence regarding endowment funds 1919-1927, Harvard Law School Dean’s Office 
Records, supra note 122, at box 2.
125. Letter from Roscoe Pound to Charles M. Hough (Nov. 28, 1924), in Correspondence 
regarding endowment funds 1919-1927, Harvard Law School Dean’s Office Records, supra 
note 122, at box 2. 
126. Roscoe Pound, The Harvard Law School: Its History, Its Development, Its Needs: a Projet 
29 (Harvard Law School Endowment Fund 1926) [hereinafter The Harvard Law School: a 
Projet].
127. Letter from Roscoe Pound to Julian Mack (Jan. 13, 1925), in Correspondence regarding 
endowment funds 1919-1927, Harvard Law School Dean’s Office Records, supra note 122, at 
box 2.
128. The Harvard Law School: a Projet, supra note 126, at 29; letter from Roscoe Pound to 
Wilson M. Powell (June 19, 1925), in Correspondence regarding endowment funds 1919-1927, 
Harvard Law School Dean’s Office Records, supra note 122, at box 2.
Charity, Philanthropy and Law School Fundraising 
268	 Journal of Legal Education
university’s series of solicitations between 1904 and 1924 had exhausted the 
capacity or inclination of many alumni to give.129
Meanwhile, the governing board approved the plan to seek $5 million and 
stood “heartily behind the drive for the law school, and ready to urge it with all 
its might,” said Lowell.130 Pound then began to draft a 30-page, pretentiously 
titled Projet to serve as “the manifesto” of the campaign.131 In March 1925, 
Wilson Powell, vice president of the New York City Bar Association, agreed to 
chair the campaign. In the ensuing months he formed an executive committee 
of 28 members and hired an executive secretary and a publicity consultant. 
Relying on this group, Powell hoped to collect almost all the money from a 
small number of wealthy donors and foundations through a quiet appeal in 
August and September of 1925, thereby avoiding a public drive.132 “If that does 
not succeed,” he wrote, “then [we will] start a drive, making all preparations 
for it now, so that we will waste no time in the fall.”133
Tactical problems beset the campaign, however. Pound quickly lost patience 
with the process of achieving consensus on plans among prominent alumni, 
the faculty, the governing board and the Overseers Visiting Committee to 
the Law School.134 By May 1925, he grew impatient with the critical feedback 
from Powell and other prominent alumni on successive drafts of his Projet.135 
Furthermore, as in the centennial campaign, Pound devoted most of his effort 
to writing visionary statements for distribution in print or in speeches. He 
129. Letter from Jeremiah Smith Jr. to Roscoe Pound (Aug. 15, 1925), in Correspondence 
regarding endowment funds 1919-1927, Harvard Law School Dean’s Office Records, supra 
note 122, at box 2.
130. Letter from A. L. Lowell to Roscoe Pound (July 24, 1925), in Correspondence regarding 
endowment funds 1919-1927, Harvard Law School Dean’s Office Records, supra note 122, at 
box 2. 
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1916-1936, sect. IV C 2 (unpublished third-year paper, Harvard Law School, 1999). See The 
Harvard Law School: a Projet, supra note 126, at 29. Another pamphlet gained some notoriety, 
but Pound’s carried more weight. See Memorandum Concerning Plan for the Development 
of Harvard Law School (Mar. 30, 1926), in John Price Jones Co. Records 1919-1954, at box 
CH, v. 57 (on file with Harvard Bus. School Library, Special Collections); Socializing Legal 
Education, 46 The New Republic 211, 211-213 (1926).
132. Letter from Wilson M. Powell to Roscoe Pound (Mar. 7, 1925); letter from Joseph P. 
Cotton to Roscoe Pound (Mar. 2, 1925); letter from Wilson M. Powell to Roscoe Pound 
(Mar. 18, 1925), in Correspondence regarding endowment funds 1919-1927, Harvard Law 
School Dean’s Office Records, supra note 122, at box 2; Ravi P. Ramchandani, The Stalling 
Effort: The Harvard Law School Endowment Campaign of 1925-1927 19-22 (May 2012) 
(unpublished Legal History Seminar Paper, Harvard Law School) (on file with Professor 
Daniel R. Coquillette).
133. Powell to Pound (June 1, 1925), in Correspondence regarding endowment funds 1919-1927, 
Harvard Law School Dean’s Office Records, supra note 122, at box 2.
134. See Ramchandani, supra note 132, at 13-16.
135. Roscoe Pound to James F. Byrne (May 5, 1925); Roscoe Pound to Wilson M. Powell (May 
5, 1925), in Correspondence regarding endowment funds 1919-1927, Harvard Law School 
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spent little time visiting prospective donors, except for a few major prospects 
in the summer of 1925. In contrast, the Harvard Endowment Fund organizers 
and staff believed that “personal solicitation is the only satisfactory method” 
of fundraising. Writing statements, they believed, “results in very few 
subscriptions.”136
In addition, Pound made himself unavailable at critical points. He took a 
leave from the deanship to serve on the American-British Claims Arbitration 
Tribunal in Washington, D.C., for most of the fall of 1925,137 the period when 
Powell intended to raise the money. Upon returning from his leave, Pound 
faced a backlog of administrative work and teaching that limited his efforts 
to help the campaign.138 Nevertheless, dozens of HLS alumni wrote to Pound 
in April volunteering to help after a blizzard of announcements appeared in 
newspapers139 and he worked with the executive committee to form 18 regional 
committees. But Pound then told Powell that he would be occupied giving 
lectures at nine universities between May and July.140
Yet, the dean did successfully solicit a major contribution that suited his 
philanthropic approach. Beginning in November 1924, he made a concerted 
effort to interest the Rockefeller-endowed General Education Board and 
succeeded in obtaining a commitment for a conditional grant of $750,000, 
contingent upon securing a two-to-one match to build an endowment of 
$2,250,000 for “research and graduate instruction in law.” Officially announced 
in March 1926,141 this grant was, in fact, the only yield from the quiet appeal 
to major donors during all of 1925. Consequently, in the early months of 1926 
Powell and the executive committee began to plan for a second phase, the 
public drive that they had wanted to avoid.142 
136. Letter from Wells to Atkins, supra note 90.
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Little money had been contributed to that point because tactical problems, 
similar to Pound’s, also beset the members of the executive committee. They 
therefore retained John Price Jones, Inc. (JPJ), the leading consulting firm 
at that time for fundraising in higher education. Beginning work in late June 
1926, the firm guided the HLS campaign over the next year.143 There was a 
great deal to do. With the guidance of JPJ, the executive committee developed 
a “Survey and Plan” projecting that $2 million could be raised from the 
9,400 alumni and former law students, perhaps $1,750,000 from foundations, 
including the General Education grant, and another $2 million from the lay 
public and wealthy lawyers.144 
Tactical problems persisted, however. In September 1926, the John Price 
Jones supervisor reported that the law school campaign had fallen at least a 
month behind because the executive secretary made decisions too slowly and 
the executive committee members were frequently unavailable. In addition, 
the supervisor suspected “that the field organization is largely a paper one and 
cannot be expected to function rapidly and efficiently when the bell rings.”145 
At the end of October, he observed that the HLS drive demonstrates “how 
badly a campaign can be organized . . . . [T]he patient is doing as well as can 
be expected under the circumstances, bearing in mind that . . . an enterprise 
with less prestige than Harvard Law School would have [been] killed . . . off 
long ago.”146
In late October and early November a series of dinners in Boston, New York, 
Philadelphia and St. Louis kicked off the campaign.147 In the next few months, 
subscriptions came in steadily and reached $1,114,067 in January 1927.148 The 
campaign then stalled until it seemed “to be standing almost still.”149 Powell 
143. See Daily Reports and Weekly Reports, in John Price Jones Co. Records 1919-1954, supra note 
131, at box CH, v. 47.
144. Survey and Plan of Fund-Raising for Harvard, University Law School Endowment Fund 
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1954, supra note 131, at box CH, v. 47.
146. Duncan, Situation Report (Oct. 30, 1926), supra note 145, at 3, 5.
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5.
149. Letter from Wilson M. Powell to Roscoe Pound (Jan. 31, 1927), in Correspondence regarding 
endowment funds 1919-1927, Harvard Law School Dean’s Office Records, supra note 122, at 
box 1.
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boldly asked the Harvard Corporation, the university’s governing board, 
for an advance of $200,000 to pay expenses for a third phase, an appeal to 
the public to reach $5 million. But the Corporation doubted a third phase 
could succeed and refused. Pound was willing to sink $100,000 from the law 
school’s surplus into the venture, but he and Powell finally decided against 
going forward alone with the third phase.150 
A critical problem remained because the drive needed $323,000 more 
dollars in contributions to reach the $1.5 million necessary to secure the 
General Education Board matching grant of $750,000.151 While Pound was off 
lecturing, Powell worked through April, May and June writing to individuals 
to secure the balance by commencement.152 Even this amount proved difficult to 
raise, and the school faced the embarrassment of falling short until Rockefeller 
personally offered $100,000 contingent on obtaining the $223,000 needed to 
satisfy the terms of the General Education grant.153 With Rockefeller’s face-
saving gift, the campaign achieved the match just before the commencement 
deadline.
This outcome led Lowell to view the campaign with “satisfaction” and Pound 
to consider it “fully subscribed.”154 Various Harvard historians have declared 
it “a great success.”155 In fact, the amount was well short of even the scaled-
back goal of $5 million approved by the Corporation. Total contributions 
amounted to about $2,250,000, including the Rockefeller funded foundation 
grant of $750,000 and Rockefeller’s personal contribution of $100,000.156 
Non-contingent gifts from individuals therefore amounted to only about $1.4 
million, including $200,000 from 125 non-alumni and about $1.2 million from 
3,492 alumni.157 
In its final report in July 1927, John Price Jones announced a summative 
tally of $3,508,180 raised. But this inflated figure counted a loan of $1,250,000 
from the university for the building fund, a loan that eventually swelled to 
150. Ramchandani, supra note 132, at 40-41
151. Letter from Wilson M. Powell to A. L. Lowell (Mar. 2, 1927), in President Abbott Lawrence 
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154. A. L. Lowell, Annual Report of the President of Harvard University 1926-27 5-6, 22-3 (1927); 
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(Harvard Univ. Press 1948); Clark, supra note 131, at sect. IV C 2.
156. Form letter by Wilson M. Powell (n.d.), in John Price Jones Co. Records 1919-1954, supra 
note 135, at box CH, v. 50; Harvard University Law School Endowment Fund Final Report, 
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$1,463,447.158 Pound likewise avoided mentioning both the loan and the 100 
percent tuition hike that the university required as a condition of the loan.159 
In fact, Pound complained that the entire amount for the building fund could 
have been raised if the Corporation had supported the third phase in 1927, and 
he speculated that it refused in deference to other departments that wanted to 
raise money.160 In Pound’s exculpatory view, the Corporation’s lack of support 
halted the campaign, resulting in the need for the loan.
Nevertheless, the final tally was not inconsequential. Arriving between 
1924 and 1930, the funds contributed to enlarging the HLS endowment by 
259 percent, an increase comparing well to other leading law schools. Those 
at Columbia and Yale were only beginning to organize campaigns, and their 
endowments, though increasing, were still dwarfed by that of HLS, as seen in 
Table 1.161
158. Id.; Erwin N. Griswold, Annual Report of the Dean of Harvard Law School 1947-48 390 
(1948).
159. Roscoe Pound to Wilson M. Powell (Apr. 27, 1927), in Correspondence regarding endowment 
funds 1919-1927, Harvard Law School Dean’s Office Records, supra note 122, at box 1; Roscoe 
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Eliot Morison ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1930).
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Table 1 Endowments of Law Schools at Harvard, Yale and Columbia 
Universities, 1910-30 (in reported dollars)
162163164
Year (as of June) Harvard162 Yale163 Columbia164
1910 510,518 358,260 316,250
1920 969,111 500,083 488,184
1930 4,229,606 2,086,657 538,323
Notwithstanding this progress, it is important to look on the other side of 
the ledger. Between 1924 and 1930 the law school incurred nearly $1.5 million 
in debt—as much as all the non-contingent gifts received from individuals 
during the campaign. Hence, the failure of the 1925-27 campaign to reach its 
goal by more than half had enormous consequences, and the final John Price 
Jones report was markedly ambivalent for publicists prone to inflate their 
accomplishments.165 
1925-27: Failure of the Philanthropic Rationale
Harvard Law School lore subsequently attributed the deterioration of 
the campaign to the contemporaneous controversy over the Sacco-Vanzetti 
case, involving Pound, Frankfurter and Lowell. Supposedly, the controversy 
alienated alumni on both sides of the issue and detracted from giving to the 
campaign.166 But little evidence supports this.167 According to the consulting 
firm, the fundamental problem was that, among HLS alumni and faculty, 
“every one indulges in a lot of discussion about the campaign but scarcely 
162. Charles F. Adams, Annual Statement of the Treasurer of Harvard University 1909-1910 11, 63 
(1910); Charles F. Adams, Annual Statement of the Treasurer of Harvard University 1919-20 
11, 130 (1920); Charles F. Adams, Annual Statement of the Treasurer of Harvard University 
1929-1930 8, 267 (1930).
163. George P. Day, Annual Report of the Treasurer of Yale University 1909-1910 88, 132 (1910); 
George P. Day, Annual Report of the Treasurer of Yale University 1919-1920 16, 96 (1920); 
George P. Day, Annual Report of the Treasurer of Yale University 1930-31 109-110, 190-1 
(1931).
164. Frederick A. Goetze, Annual Report of the Treasurer of Columbia University 1919-1920 
323-53, 408-431 (1920); Frederick A. Goetze, Annual Report of the Treasurer of Columbia 
University 1929-30 106-146 (1930).
165. Harvard University Law School Endowment Fund Final Report, supra note 156, at 1-4.
166. Sutherland, supra note 151, at 261; Yeomans, supra note 155, at 252-3; Hull, supra note 91, at 
149-150, 156, 161; Erwin N. Griswold, Ould Fields, New Corne: The Personal Memoirs of a 
Twentieth Century Lawyer 158 (West Group 1992).
167. Ramchandani, supra note 132, at 47. About $2,000 of pledges were cancelled because of the 
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anyone does any work.”168 Regarding the leaders, the JPJ firm’s supervisor 
observed that, “unless this leadership is much more positive or vigorous than 
it has been in the last six months, there is no chance of completing the fund.”169 
Regarding the followers, the consulting firm’s staff found that “we have been 
unable to get any effective personal solicitation . . . in the various cities around 
the country.”170 In the end “a chronic state of inertia . . . settled over everyone 
in our campaign organization,” reported the JPJ staff.171
Thus, the tactical problems of the campaign stemmed largely from volunteers’ 
lethargy and apathy. The lack of energy and interest was rooted in the inability 
to explain to alumni or others why they should donate to the law school. The 
waning ideology of charity certainly could not provide the justification any 
better than it had in 1882, and neither Pound nor the executive committee 
invoked it. In fact, the General Education Board prohibited it. When awarding 
its grant of $750,000, the foundation stipulated that no funds should support 
professional training for lawyers.172 The potential for raising money for legal 
education depended on how well the appeal could be justified in terms of 
the philanthropic ideology that increasingly predominated in benefaction for 
higher education. Pound had to explain the “signal public service” that, he 
claimed, would issue from donations to support legal scholarship at Harvard.173
Medical education was the exemplar. In 1900, massive contributions began 
flowing into Harvard Medical School, and by 1902 it possessed “a larger 
endowment than any other professional department of the university.”174 
By 1914, Yale Medical School did the same.175 The reason was undisputed: 
“the hope of beneficent results from medical and surgical research . . . has 
made it easy to procure large gifts to the medical school. Rich men who 
have intelligent imaginations see that there is a fair prospect of obtaining in 
medical laboratories great benef[it]s for the human race.”176 In 1929, Lowell 
168. Letter from W. R. Hauslaib to Robert F. Duncan (Mar. 15, 1927), in John Price Jones Co. 
Records 1919-1954, supra note 131, at box CH, v. 57.
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Endowment Fund Committee, Bulletin No. VII, at 3 (Dec. 11, 1926) (on file with Records 
of the Harvard Law Endowment Fund 1926-1938, container of money raising promotional 
literature 1926-1927).
171. Duncan, supra note 145 (Apr. 1, 1927).
172. Yeomans, supra note 155, at 252-3.
173. Pound, Annual Report of the Dean of Harvard Law School 1923-24, supra note 123 186.
174. Charles W. Eliot, Annual Report of the President of Harvard College 1900-1901 49-50 (1901).
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reported that the joint income of the Schools of Medicine and Public Health 
had increased 400 percent since 1920177 The comparative increase for the law 
school was 36 percent.178
For more than a decade, Pound had recognized the allure of medical research. 
“The social hygiene involved in proper investigation in a law school is quite 
as important as the individual hygiene investigated in the medical school,” he 
wrote.179 Regarding his favorite field of criminal law, Pound suggested, “we 
may expect endowment of such a chair to be no less fruitful of results than the 
endowments of medical research which have been so conspicuously fruitful in 
recent years.”180 Lowell likewise invoked the point,181 as did the dean of Yale 
Law School: “Just as the public has been ready to give necessary financial 
support to the improvement of medical education, the combating of disease 
and the creating of better health conditions, so, we believe, will it be ready to 
aid efforts to improve legal education and to promote the research essential to 
bettering the administration of justice.”182
But Pound appeared wary of analogies to medicine, which he made only 
in letters and annual reports and avoided in his public manifesto for the 1925-
27 campaign. Instead, his Projet advanced the philanthropic rationale in two 
limited respects. First, he focused on the benefits of legal research and graduate 
education, largely neglecting needs associated with LL.B. instruction. 
But those needs created the fundamental financial problems of the school. 
Since the arrival of Dean Thayer in 1914, the law school had for two decades 
lamented the problem of tuition dependence. Pound had led the chorus, 
repeatedly complaining about the “box office plan” whereby “the school must 
live from hand to mouth.”183 However, perhaps because arguments to support 
law students had always been interpreted as appeals for undeserved charity, 
he dedicated 97 percent of the requested $3 million of endowment to support 
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professorships, fellowships, publications and library services associated with 
research.184 Meanwhile, the $2 million requested for land and buildings would 
raise maintenance costs and require a tuition increase, as Pound conceded.185 
Consequently, the goal for the 1925-27 campaign implied expanding the 
school’s dependence on LL.B. tuition and worsening the problematic 
syndrome of the law school’s finances.
Pound’s inattention to LL.B. students seemed totally wrongheaded to some 
faculty, even apart from neglecting to appeal for endowment to support it. 
Professor Edward H. Warren regretted that the dean and many of the faculty 
“take a greater interest, enthusiasm and pride in graduate courses than in 
undergraduate [LL.B.] courses.” In fact, “the greatest asset of this school 
will prove to be the good will of those students who have obtained here the 
foundation of their success. . . . [T]heir response to an appeal for funds . . . 
would yield substantial results.”186 The failure of the campaign focused on 
graduate studies and research seemed to confirm Warren’s judgment..
Second, Pound’s Projet attempted to explain the social benefit of legal 
research and graduate education but in a very limited way. He asserted that 
legal scholars and lawyers must assist legislatures in writing better laws and 
“make law-making take account of the social facts to which it must be applied 
and at the same time fit harmoniously into the legal system of which it must 
be a part.”187 He also affirmed that “administration of criminal justice is 
admittedly the weakest point in the American polity. No subject of research 
affords greater possibilities.”188 However, Pound did not provide details, 
evidence, or examples of social benefit beyond his previous statements. The 
1925 Projet repeated the approach, arguments, and language of Pound’s 1919 
pamphlet and earlier annual reports. He kept invoking the experience of the 
19th century as evidence, and elliptically restating that benefits would flow from 
legal research. 
Above all, he neglected to address, or even acknowledge, the “widespread 
skepticism among a certain class of practical men, in and out of our profession,” 
that legal research and graduate study is socially useful, as James Thayer had 
written.189 Indeed, Pound recognized this skepticism, for he raged privately 
that the dean of Harvard Business School, an HLS graduate, was giving 
184. The Harvard Law School: a Projet, supra note 126, at 23.
185. Id. at 20, 29.
186. Edward H. Warren, Harvard Law School Outlook in November, 1941—Statement made at 
a meeting, Nov. 23, 1941, of the Visiting Committee of the Harvard Law School, in Spartan 
Education 58-59 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1942).
187. The Harvard Law School: a Projet, supra note 126, at 22.
188. Id. at 21.
189. Thayer, supra note 73, at 174.
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lectures around the country that criticized law’s capacity to improve industry 
and business.190 But Pound did not address the skepticism.
Immediately upon coming aboard in June, 1926, the John Price Jones 
staff expressed doubts about Pound’s Projet. They endorsed his philanthropic 
theme “that there is a vital public service to be done by our law schools in re-
making the law into an effective instrument for the orderly development of our 
present complex society.” However, while “the theme is admirably set forth in 
a manner that will strikingly appeal to lawyers and alumni, there is a question 
as to whether [Pound’s] presentation will catch the attention of the laymen. 
For them the appeal should be developed in a less technical, and more popular 
style.” In addition, “for businessmen, the central theme should be presented . . . 
on the ground that the proposed research work would make it possible for the 
growth of the law to keep pace with the growth of big business.”191 In sum, “the 
appeal must be reduced to terms of every-day life. The man of affairs must be 
shown that scientific study of the law will bring results comparable with those 
already obtained by research workers in business and industry.”192
The consulting firm’s doubts evidently did not convince Pound or Powell, 
because the campaign published 15,000 copies of the Projet and distributed it 
to more than 10,000 alumni and prominent judges in the fall of 1926.193 Then 
in October the criticism was repeated. In remarks at the kick-off dinner in 
Boston, the university’s leading volunteer fundraiser, Anglican Bishop William 
Lawrence, maintained that the campaign must “show all walks of life why 
Harvard Law School was needed for their welfare, safety, and happiness.”194 
The JPJ staff also sharpened its critique:
It serves no purpose to keep telling the average citizen what a very fine thing 
law research is. He wants to know what law research will do . . . . He is not 
interested in generalities, law books and law libraries. He is interested in crime 
and crime prevention . . .[and] in the conflict and disorder whenever legislation 
is given an oppressive twist. . . . When we turn to the businessman, the appeal 
must be placed on a business basis. It is not enough to say that the science of law 
must keep pace with the science of business . . . . The businessman is engaged 
in buying and selling . . . . The purpose of this publicity is . . . to state . . .:  
What Legal Research Could Accomplish?195
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Since Pound could not effectively answer this critical question, the 
consulting company’s staff prepared a new manifesto, while focusing all 
campaign publicity on “the need for scientific research in the field of law.”196 
It took until April 1927 to hash out a new statement explaining unmistakably 
to the laity the social benefit of legal research: For the Safety of the Citizen and the 
Protection of Business, A plan to eliminate from the administration of justice in this country 
many elements of delay, waste, friction and uncertainty which are threatening the general security 
and hampering commerce and industry.197 By the time 5,600 copies of this 80-page 
pamphlet were mailed to prominent periodicals and individuals across the 
country,198 “the chronic state of inertia” had seized the campaign. Yet, it is 
doubtful that the second manifesto would have mattered because it further 
demonstrated the difficulty in explaining the social benefit of legal research. 
Whereas Pound appeared unwilling or unable to do so, the JPJ staff fitted this 
appeal into the Procrustean bed of scientific naturalism and a direct causal 
model of social benefit.
Addressing the question “What is meant by legal research?” For the Safety of 
the Citizen and the Protection of Business pointed to “the proved methods of Pasteur 
and Reed and Banting and Faraday” through which “many terrible scourges—
hydrophobia, typhoid, diphtheria, malaria, yellow fever, diabetes—have 
been brought under control.”199 The pamphlet also emphasized the “public 
demand . . . that national law schools shall function as great law laboratories, 
directly serving the public interest in much the same way as chemical and 
engineering laboratories, university hospitals and clinics or our great scientific 
foundations.”200 
A primary benefit of such experimental research would be simpler, more 
efficient law, it said, particularly in matters of crime and business. Regarding 
crime, the pamphlet’s opening anecdote described the lamentable delay in 
extraditing and trying a heinous criminal, whose case exemplified how “the 
modern professional criminal frequently finds a way to elude justice through 
the archaic technicalities of our inherited procedure.”201 Legal research was 
evidently going to determine how to try, convict and jail criminals expeditiously. 
Records 1919-1954, supra note 131, at box CH, v. 57.
196. See Harvard University Law School Endowment Fund News Releases (Nov. 1926–April 
1927), in John Price Jones Co. Records 1919-1954, supra note 131, at box CH, v. 51.
197. For the Safety of the Citizen and the Protection of Business, a plan to eliminate from 
the administration of justice in this country many elements of delay, waste, friction, and 
uncertainty which are threatening the general security and hampering commerce and 
industry (Harvard Law School Endowment Fund 1927), in John Price Jones Co. Records 
1919-1954, supra note 131, at box CH, v. 50 [hereinafter For the Safety].
198. See form letter by Wilson M. Powell (Apr. 27, 1927), in John Price Jones Co. Records 1919-
1954, supra note 131, at box CH, v. 50.
199. For the Safety, supra note 197, at 11.
200. Id. at 15.
201. Id. at 9, 21.
279
No mention was made about rights of the accused or the possibility that 
suspected criminals might be innocent or the paradox that lawyers had created 
the archaic technicalities that they now were volunteering to fix for a donation.
In the domain of business, the new manifesto assailed “legal uncertainties” 
and “legal perplexities” that undermine “those conditions of certainty and 
uniformity which are so important to the safe, orderly and expeditious 
development of business and industry.”202 The pamphlet did not say how 
professional expertise would cure the ills of arcane technicality to which 
professional expertise had often contributed. Nor did the pamphlet consider 
whether technicality and complexity might be necessary.203
In addition, For the Safety of the Citizen and the Protection of Business discarded 
Pound’s argument for continuity and reconciliation between old and new 
law, arguing that “modern conditions call for modern law” adjusted to “the 
wholly different and much more complicated conditions of a present-day 
America, which is predominantly urban and industrial.”204 No consideration 
was given to the question of whether such adjustment might entail new social 
arrangements that might be controversial. Furthermore, commensurate with 
its enthusiasm for scientific naturalism, the pamphlet neglected politics. It 
suggested that legal research would yield practical improvements. But, even 
when considering how legal research could improve the “ill-considered, badly 
drawn, experimental, first-impression legislation with which the country is 
flooded from year to year,” no mention was made of the politics involved in 
enacting legislation.205
Fundamentally, the published manifesto of the consulting firm did not 
appreciate the complex relationship between legal research and public benefit. 
HLS faculty had pointed to this complexity when instructing JPJ staff on 
“Things to Remember” in preparing publicity for the campaign, including: 
“Make no rash promises that legal research is a cure-all. . . . Legal research is 
. . . not the same as medical research. . . . When possible, base arguments on 
business law and administration of justice, rather than on sensational aspects 
of criminal law.”206 Nevertheless, the consulting firm attempted to explain the 
social benefit of legal research through a causal model drawing on scientific 
naturalism. 
In the end, neither HLS leaders nor the John Price Jones consultants 
adequately responded to the problem that “to the layman the campaign’s 
dominant theme—the value of legal research to American society—would 
probably seem questionable. The law was highly technical; its reform appeared 
unrelated to the ordinary man’s daily welfare. It sometimes seemed a mass 
202. Id. at 9-10.
203. Id. at 13-15, 24.
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of exasperating rules, tending to re tard rather than to forward the ends of 
true justice.”207 The consulting firm knew what lay philanthropists wanted to 
hear; the legal academics knew what they did and could do. Across the gap 
between them, the 1925-27 campaign failed to build a conceptual bridge that 
philanthropy could cross to endow legal education.
Conclusion
The three early stages in developing a full-fledged fundraising campaign 
for legal education at Harvard were hampered by circumstantial, tactical, 
institutional, and human factors that contributed to their failure to reach, or 
even approach, their goals. But the fundamental problem was the inability 
to construct a persuasive rationale. Donors resisted giving charity to law 
students and law schools, and law professors and deans could not explain 
and justify their scholarship in philanthropic terms, particularly in light of 
public skepticism about the social benefit of the legal profession. Leaders 
of the successful HEF campaign maintained “that the two great lines of 
publicity are the appeal to the intellect and the appeal to the heart. If you 
can get both of these, you can hardly fail.”208 Though preeminent in the field, 
Harvard Law School could get neither between 1880 and 1930. The failure to 
justify fundraising had important consequences. Without gifts for the needed 
new building, HLS sought help from the university, which drove a relatively 
hard bargain. Yale and Columbia universities had assisted their law schools 
when facing similar circumstances in previous decades,209 while Harvard had 
enthusiastically supported the fundraising of its medical and business schools. 
But the Harvard Corporation nurtured the law school through deprivation, 
even though, or perhaps because, four of the seven members of the Corporation 
had graduated from the school. The university thus lent the law school more 
than $1,400,000 at market rates for the building and required it to raise tuition 
by 100 percent to service the debt.210 At the end of its campaign, HLS was a 
larger school with more students, buildings, expenses, and debt.211 It was even 
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more dependent on tuition. The loan on the building was not paid off until 
1948 and cost the school over $430,000 in interest.212
The long-term financial implications have been serious. Among law schools, 
Harvard is extremely wealthy. Its endowment is now about three times larger 
than the next largest endowments of any law school in the country, which 
belong to Yale, Stanford and Columbia.213 But, outside the field of law, the best 
endowed law school in the nation has remained more dependent on tuition 
than its peers in the strongest domains of professional education. Today the 
endowment of Harvard Law School is less than half that of the much smaller 
Harvard Medical School, whose endowment was half that of the law school in 
1895. The law school endowment is about two-thirds that of Harvard Business 
School, founded a century after the law school in an academic field with a 
lesser pedigree.214 
Even more significant, during the 2000s the fraction of revenue that the 
school draws from tuition is greater than for any other school at Harvard, 
including the education school, the divinity school, and the school of 
design.215 In this sense, the law school has remained “the worst endowed of 
all the great departments of professional education.” Like other law schools, 
the wealthiest law school in the country is still caught in the syndrome of 
relatively low endowment, high tuition, high enrollment, and a tendency 
toward overcrowding, which leads to expanding physical plant, debt, and 
tuition dependence.216 The seeds were planted between 1880 and 1930.
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